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before the federal election of 24 November 2007. 
Ce
nt
re
 f
or
 A
bo
ri
gi
na
l E
co
no
m
ic
 P
ol
ic
y 
Re
se
ar
ch
, T
op
ic
al
 Is
su
e 
N
o.
 1
6/
20
07
An
 e
le
ct
ro
ni
c 
pu
bl
ic
at
io
n 
do
w
nl
oa
de
d 
fr
om
 <
ht
tp
:/
/w
w
w
.a
nu
.e
du
.a
u/
ca
ep
r/
>. H istory will look back at the federal ‘national emergency’ intervention of 21 June 2007 and see it for what it is: a bizarre moment in Indigenous policy making without precedent since 1967; certainly without precedent in 
the 30 years I have been involved with Indigenous policy; and hopefully an event that will never recur.
The reference to ‘neo-paternalism’ in my title refers to the return of an approach from an earlier era discarded as 
policy some 40 years ago: the era of assimilation that was a failure for both Indigenous Australians and the nation. 
Perhaps the images from a card currently being distributed by Centrelink throughout prescribed communities (as 
remote area welfare exemptions are progressively removed) capture some of what is going on in the Northern 
Territory (Fig. 1).
How this national emergency came about will, with time, have many interpretations. There is already a growing 
literature on this issue; what I present today is my interpretation.1 The Little Children are Sacred report by Pat 
Anderson and Rex Wild was completed at the end of April 2007 and released in mid June: this report, the most 
recent of many in the past 18 years, provides a horrific and very moving account of cases of child sexual abuse 
in many Northern Territory communities.2 It acted as one catalyst for the announcement of the intervention (the 
‘Northern Territory Emergency Response’, henceforth NTER). It is notable that the decision was taken at the level 
of the leadership, by the Prime Minister and his Minister, not by the government of the day or the executive. 
There have been a number of rationales provided for why the decision to intervene was made at this time. They 
include the following:
• Frustration that the Northern Territory Government had not moved quickly enough in implementing 
the Anderson/Wild report;
• A desire by Mal Brough, an ambitious and passionate Indigenous Affairs Minister, to cut through 
political and bureaucratic inertia;
• Electoral and political opportunism based around ‘wedging’ the federal Opposition (that is, using the 
divisive and controversial nature of the issue to split apart or create a ‘wedge’ in the support base of 
the Australian Labor Party);
The author would like to thank colleagues in the five communities surveyed, and at CAEPR, John Hughes 
for editorial and research assistance and Geoff Buchanan for proofing. 
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• The need to be seen as taking an initiative in the run up to an election, using the concerted and 
often sensationalised media focus on Indigenous negatives as a populist aid; and
• The existence of federal ‘territory powers’ that provide the constitutional rationale for such 
interventions.
In the recently published No, Prime Minister, political scientists James Walter and Paul Strangio suggest 
that the NTER is an example of John Howard’s frenzied instinct to control as he contemplates power 
slipping away.3 There is also a suggestion that Howard was genuinely moved by a radio interview that Noel 
Pearson gave on Monday 18 June, advocating for Cape York reform.
In the 138 days [to 7 November 2007] since the intervention was declared—with its mobilisation of the 
armed forces, unprecedented powers for civilians and police, and recruitment of volunteer aid workers—
there has been a frenzied level of media attention in Indigenous affairs (even during the federal election 
campaign), and frenetic bursts of policy-making on the run. Blind faith defence of the intervention by 
politicians and their agents has usually been based on a seeming unassailable call to ‘save the children’, a 
moral imperative that hides unstated, untested, but very evident ideological motivations far removed from 
concerns of child welfare.
There is a view that the NT intervention was concocted in a few days, mainly by Howard, Brough and two 
very senior bureaucrats. However, it did not have a virgin birth: in fact it is the result of a considerable policy 
history that accords with the Prime Minister’s long-held ideological preconceptions around ‘normalisation’ 
for Indigenous Australians. This goes back a long way, and was certainly evident in Howard’s very sceptical 
response to the existing policy framework on his election in 1996. Reconstituting Indigenous affairs was 
a core ideological issue for the first Howard Government, and was primarily expressed through a litany 
of negatives: anti ATSIC (the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission), anti native title, anti 
reconciliation, anti the rights agenda, anti apologizing to the Stolen Generation, anti land rights and anti 
the diverse intercultural institutions of Indigenous Australia that Tim Rowse has termed ‘the Indigenous 
sector’.4 Howard, so dominant in the past decade, was and remains a sceptic about cultural difference.
The Prime Minister tried to dilute and demolish many Indigenous institutions but was largely unsuccessful 
(bar the Native Title Act amendments of 1998) because of a hostile Senate. Walter and Strangio contend 
however, that on core ideological issues neither evidence nor public opinion will dissuade Howard, he has 
the patience to bide his time and await more favourable political circumstances.
These more favourable circumstances came in 2004, first when—owing to accidental bipartisanship 
between Labor’s Mark Latham and the Prime Minister—ATSIC was abolished. Then came the Coalition 
Senate majority from 1 July 2005, which delivered an unexpected bonus. For the first time since 1996, the 
Howard Government was unfettered in Indigenous affairs (and in other policy areas).
With the abolition of ATSIC, the central concepts of Indigenous policy were changed from a paradigm loosely 
termed ‘self determination’ to a cluster of terms centred on ‘mutual obligation’, ‘shared responsibility’, 
‘mainstreaming’ and ‘normalisation’—a language borrowed from international social policy developments 
in other neoliberal states.5
At the same time, the nature of public expenditures in Indigenous affairs were changed: Indigenous-
specific programs were moved to mainstream agencies and Indigenous specific allocations were shifted 
gradually from more settled to more remote regions, as noted just yesterday [6 November 2007], by Morris 
Iemma, the Premier of NSW.6
Indeed, policy and popular discourse focused increasingly on two remote regions: Cape York and the 
Northern Territory. In the former such focus was invited, in the latter it was uninvited. An escalating and 
increasingly ideological conservative rhetoric highlighted real and imagined past failure in policy; much, 
NTER:  
Northern Territory 
Emergency 
Response
ATSIC:  
Aboriginal 
and Torres 
Strait Islander 
Commission
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Fig. 1. A Centrelink pamphlet distributed in prescribed communities during 
the Northern Territory Emergency Response.
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like land rights and the Community Development Employment Projects (CDEP) programme, developed 
prior to 1996. However, this nascent public discourse generally ignored the accountability of the Howard 
Government since its election in 1996.
In Indigenous affairs, the Howard Government has set what I have previously termed the NT ‘trap’ or 
‘pincer’ into which it is easy to fall.7 On one hand the policy focus is increasingly on only 66,000 out of 
517,000 Indigenous people, some 13% of the total Indigenous population.8 The Australian Government’s 
public views are increasingly defined in terms of the remotest dwelling Aboriginal people.
On the other hand, this focus is justified by a fiction that these locales are where things are really bad, 
especially on emotive issues like child abuse. This is simply untrue, as Ian Anderson and Peter Botsman have 
pointed out using Australian Institute of Health and Welfare sex abuse notification data published earlier 
this year.9
Things in the NT are bad though, when compared to Australia-wide Indigenous standards, as the latest 2006 
Census data reveal (Table 1). This is because a high proportion of the NT population, 32%, is Indigenous, 
compared to the national proportion of 2.5%; and a high proportion (greater than 80%) are living in 
remote regions. It is also because the Australian Government has done little to address these issues, either 
before self-government in 1978 when it administered the NT, or since 1978 as it has continued to deliver 
major initiatives such as the CDEP programme and Community Housing and Infrastructure Program (CHIP) 
to remote communities.
Table 1. Comparison of key variables: Northern Territory Indigenous versus 
Australia Indigenous, 2006.
Variable
Northern Territory 
– Indigenous 
Australia– 
Indigenous Ratio
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 14.4 15.6 0.9
Labour force participation rate (% adults) 38.9 51.2 0.8
Employment to population ratio (% adults) 33.3 43.2 0.8
Private-sector employment (% adults) 19.2 32.8 0.6
Median income, Individual ($) 215 278 0.8
Median income, Household ($) 837 791 1.1
Home owner or purchasing (% households) 20.0 35.9 0.6
Average number of persons per bedroom 
(persons) 1.8 1.3 1.4
Household size (persons) 4.5 3.4 1.3
Never attended school (% adults) 8.5 2.5 3.5
Completed Year 10 or higher (% adults) 40.2 66.4 0.6
Completed Year 12 (% adults) 10.1 22.2 0.5
Post-school qualification (% adults) 13.1 23.8 0.6
Degree or higher (% adults) 1.8 4.4 0.4
Population aged over 55 years (% population) 7.7 8.2 0.9
Source: 2006 ABS Census of Population and Housing.
CDEP:  
Community 
Development 
Employment 
Projects
CHIP:  
Community 
Housing and 
Infrastructure 
Program
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Fig. 2. Prescribed communities, Northern Territory Emergency Response.
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Fig. 3. Discrete Indigenous communities, ABS, 2006.
The core neoliberal ideology of assimilation also gained momentum in the post-2004, post-ATSIC period. 
Right-wing think tanks enhanced their attacks on Indigenous difference, sometimes because remote 
communities were deemed to have too much custom that was incompatible with neoliberalism; sometimes 
because this custom was deemed to be broken, and consequently producing unacceptable lawlessness, a 
potential threat to the state and capital and Indigenous people themselves in remote regions. The Australian 
Government was very comfortable with such attacks.
Such attacks were clearest in the complex and iconic debate over land rights, where the Howard Government had 
taken a terrible policy hiding in 1999, when the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and 
Torres Strait Islander Affairs rejected the expensive and expansive Reeves report in its entirety.10 While conservative 
think tanks like the Centre for Independent Studies (CIS) and the Bennelong Society had chipped away at land 
rights before 2005, there is no doubt that their campaigns accelerated and gained boldness following the 
abolition of ATSIC. Their views were supported by conservative voices on the government-appointed National 
Indigenous Council (NIC) and by a compliant and influential Murdoch media.
Source: ABS.
CIS:  
Centre for 
Independent 
Studies
NIC:  
National 
Indigenous Council
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Fig. 4. Indigenous land interests greater than 1,000 ha as at 31 December 2006.
Source: Indigenous Land Corporation.
David Scrimgeour, in a speech to the Public Health Association of Australia made in September, analyses 
proposals in Helen Hughes’ CIS-published book Lands of Shame (the title ironically juxtaposed to H.C. 
‘Nugget’ Coombs’ Land of Promises11) and notes the similarity between her recommendations and the 
NTER measures.12 What Scrimgeour did not know is that while the book was published in May 2007 (to 
provocatively coincide with the 40th anniversary of the 1967 referendum), it was made available as a 
manuscript to the upper echelons of the Office of Indigenous Policy Coordination in February 2007, to 
ensure that it accorded with Minister Brough’s vision for remote Australia.13
At the same time we have witnessed the abandonment of consultation with Indigenous people, diminishing 
use of available statistical and research evidence and increased marginalisation of the experts—especially 
if their views diverge from national leadership. These same leaders are increasingly thinking very narrowly 
about very difficult policy problems and consequently are making poor policy decisions.14 This is something 
that I will now show to be the case in the NT intervention.
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THE NT INTERVENTIoN
The NT intervention started with a very unclear focus, but settled eventually on 73 prescribed communities 
with populations of over 200 (Fig. 2: communities marked by a circle are on Aboriginal-owned land; those 
by marked by a square are on non-Aboriginal land). It is unclear how these communities mesh with the 
640 discrete Indigenous communities in the NT (Fig. 3) or with Aboriginal owned land that covers 600,000 
sq kms of the NT (Fig. 4).
The intervention announced on 21 June consisted of 11 broad measures, with a 12th, the abolition of the 
CDEP scheme—without doubt the most destructive—being added a month later on 23 July.15
Much of the ensuing public and policy debate has focused on the fact that despite the suspension of 
critical thinking owing to the invocation of a ‘national emergency’ crisis, a number of the measures appear 
to have no link to the issue of child sex abuse. Some are indirectly linked (maybe) and some directly 
linked (maybe). The measures do not have any coherent logic or consistency, but can be clustered into the 
following three groupings:
1. Those that seek to discipline Indigenous subjects/labour/future labour
With non-discretionary quarantining of welfare incomes, supposed total grog bans, supposed total bans on 
pornography, (including, apparently, late night SBS movies), requirements for people to work for the dole 
(not CDEP) on community cleanups, and controlled tenancy arrangements that restrict modes of living, 
much of this can only be understood as aiming to ‘neoliberalise’ Indigenous labour.
2. Those that seek to dilute land rights or expand their potential for commercial development
These are the most contentious measures, because the process of abolishing permits was clearly underway 
prior to the intervention announcement, and the compulsory acquisition of township leases will dispossess 
traditional owners of their land. There is considerable scope for viewing these measures as what Pat Turner 
and Nichole Watson (2007) have termed a ‘trojan horse’ to further dispossess Aboriginal land owners.16
3. Those that seek to depoliticize democratic Indigenous organisations and to impose external control 
over townships
These measures include stripping CDEP organisations of their assets and abolishing CDEP, appointing 
government business managers with legal rights to attend the meeting of any democratically-elected 
organisation and with absolute powers in townships that probably exceed those of the settlement 
superintendent of earlier policy eras.
On 16 August, these measures were enshrined in Australian legislation that overrode the Racial Discrimination 
Act and violated human rights: the NTER suite of acts, totalling over 500 pages, were rammed through 
parliament in a week with scrutiny by a Senate Committee that was convened for just one day (and which 
received 154 submissions in the available 48 hours).17 This was a return to the negative bipartisanship that 
saw the abolition of ATSIC. It is unclear if Labor acquiesced because of their fear of being ‘wedged’ on the 
emotive issue of child sex abuse or whether they were duped by ‘national emergency’ protocols. Only two 
minor parties challenged this suspension of due parliamentary process.
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WHAT ARE THE oVERARCHING PolICy GoAlS of THE NT 
INTERVENTIoN?
The glib phrase ‘Stabilise, normalize, exit’ coined by Minister Brough on 21 June 2007 capture well both the 
militaristic humanitarianism embodied in the emergency intervention and Brough’s own army background. 
It is a phrase that Melinda Hinkson and I used as the subtitle to our book Coercive Reconciliation because 
we believe it indicates a radical shift in Indigenous affairs.18
But what does it actually mean—bearing in mind that the NTER is purportedly about child sex abuse—and 
over what time frame is the intervention to occur? It soon became apparent that the ‘stabilisation’ phase 
was for 12 months; and normalisation (undefined, but let’s assume it means practical reconciliation or 
statistical equality) is to occur in the following four years; to then be followed by ‘exit,’ a term that hardly 
seems appropriate given that it is largely state failure that has generated the present social dysfunction 
crisis.
When proclaimed on 21 June the ‘national emergency’ was about child sex abuse, but very quickly—in July and 
into August—it came to focus on the issue of dysfunction. Then on 29 August, in his first visit to the ‘national 
emergency jurisdiction’, the Prime Minister indicated that the intervention was actually about mainstreaming 
or normalizing remote living Indigenous Australians. He tellingly told residents of Hermannsburg that ‘whilst 
respecting the special place of indigenous people in the history and life of this country, their future can only be 
as part of the mainstream of the Australian community’.19 
The Prime Minister’s Hermannsburg statement raises three issues:
1. Does the externally defined aim of normalization accord with Indigenous aspirations across 
the 73 prescribed communities, or put another way, do non-mainstream, culturally-different 
Australians want to be like ‘the rest of us’? (John Daly, Chairman of the Northern Land Council, 
put this question to the NTER Senate Committee hearing on 10 August).20
2. Is normalization by 2012 achievable, bearing in mind the snail’s pace of progress in achieving 
‘practical reconciliation’ between 1996 and 2007?
3. Even if desirable and achievable, will the latest policy framework, as now established, get us 
there? Will it deliver?
Let’s examine each of these questions in turn.
What are Indigenous aspirations?
The first question can be answered briefly and in two ways. First, on theoretical grounds alone, top-down, 
imposed universalistic policies cannot take into account the diversity of Indigenous community perspectives 
or circumstances. Second, how would we know? There are no Indigenous representative organisations at 
the regional level to inform us, except perhaps for land councils, and those at the community level are 
being destroyed. All we have is the perspectives of conservative think tanks, the NIC, and Noel Pearson’s 
influential Cape York Institute promoting particular views about Indigenous aspirations.
Is ‘normalization’ or ‘mainstreaming’ achievable?
These two terms are used interchangeably but rarely defined. They are highly contested notions and have 
a number of potential interpretations. At one end of the spectrum is the interpretation that Indigenous 
people should have access to the same range of programs and services available to other Australians. Few 
would argue with that. At the other end of the spectrum is the notion of normalization with which the 
Prime Minister is comfortable: that Indigenous citizens should take on the economic and social norms 
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of ‘mainstream Australia’. The big picture answer to this second interpretation is that equality of socio-
economic status will not occur if people continue to live on their land in remote Australia, if they retain 
distinct cultural practices and priorities and if they resist or do not desire to move up the settlement 
hierarchy to towns and cities (even though official statistics tell us equality in these locales is far from 
assured). 
The enormity of the socio-economic gap is evident in Table 2, derived from the 2006 Census, that compares 
Indigenous and non-Indigenous Territorians. There is a new political correctness and neo-liberal arrogance 
that we can all be well-off, but in reality there are 2 million Australians living in poverty with too many 
Indigenous Australians among them.21
Will the current policy framework deliver?
Again, how would we know? A recent Australian National Audit Office report is ever-so-politely critical 
of the overwhelming evidence it presents that there is no implementation plan and no means to monitor 
progress following the establishment of the new arrangements in Indigenous affairs in 2004.22 Similarly 
a report by the government-selected consultants Morgan Disney & Associates indicates that in 80 Shared 
Responsibility Agreements (SRAs) with Indigenous communities to date, it is government that is not 
meeting its commitments.23
I am willing to predict that moving people from work to welfare, instituting quarantining regimes that will 
be expensive and ineffective according to international evidence, compulsorily acquiring people’s land, 
removing permits, providing more education and training without development projects for employment, 
Table 2. Comparison of key variables: Northern Territory Indigenous versus 
Northern Territory non Indigenous, 2006.
Source: 2006 ABS Census of Population and Housing.
Variable
Northern Territory 
– Indigenous
Northern Territory 
– Non Indigenous Ratio
Unemployment rate (% labour force) 14.4 2.6 5.5
Labour force participation rate (% adults) 38.9 78.7 0.5
Employment to population ratio (% adults) 33.3 76.6 0.4
Private-sector employment (% adults) 19.2 32.8 0.6
Median income in $ (Individual) 215 712 0.3
Median income in $ (Household) 837 1,324 0.6
Home owner or purchasing (% households) 20.0 56.4 0.4
Average number of persons per bedroom 1.8 1.1 1.6
Household size (persons) 4.5 2.5 1.8
Never attended school (% adults) 8.5 0.7 13.0
Completed Year 10 or higher (% adults) 40.2 88.7 0.5
Completed Year 12 (% adults) 10.1 48.4 0.2
Post-school qualification (% adults) 13.1 52.2 0.3
Degree or higher (% adults) 1.8 19.1 0.1
Population aged over 55 years (% population) 7.7 16.1 0.5
SRA:  
Shared 
Responsibility 
Agreement
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banning grog in mainly dry communities ... the list goes on, is not a ‘viable policy framework’ for sustainable 
outcomes. This of course is counter to the official line that focuses on the positives, provided mainly by the 
Minister and the intervention Task Force and regularly reported in compliant media like The Australian. 
In an attempt to see how things are travelling four months on, I recently collaborated in some informal 
consultations with colleagues in five prescribed communities, three in central Australia and two in the 
Top End. While all these communities are happy to be identified, I have decided not to do so in case of 
possible retribution. I summarise my findings in Table 3. I note that Matthew Carney’s recent Four Corners 
investigative documentary provides remarkably similar evidence.24
This is rich data: I will only make a few observations about what it indicates to me:
1. If this is really a ‘national emergency’ there are far too many cells with ‘no’ in them—can you 
imagine finding so many in a non-Indigenous ‘emergency’ jurisdiction?
2. The one significant full ‘yes’ row is for health checks, but coverage seems incomplete. In most 
cases there has been no follow up, it seems likely that there have been no referrals for sexual 
abuse, and local health centres and staff have been by-passed by intervention teams.
3. The other two full ‘yes’ rows are for the appointment of government business managers 
(although we know that overall coverage is less than 50%) and for housing intervention staff, 
generally without using local organisations or labour. As one community noted, the Task Force 
is shipping in mobile housing that can be shipped out again.
4. The very patchiness of this matrix, which would probably get more patchy if it was extended 
to 73 communities, suggests that the ‘national emergency’ rhetoric might not be matched by a 
‘national emergency’ response. 
Four months on, it seems to me that the intervention is proving unsuccessful in meeting its own, much less 
Indigenous, goals for two main reasons.
First, the intervention is unrealistic in terms of the extent of the backlogs and resourcing. On 21 June the 
Prime Minister declared that the intervention would cost tens of millions of dollars, a view vigorously 
defended by the Minister for Finance Nick Minchin. By August this had grown to hundreds of millions 
of dollars, and by September it had reached $1,400 million. My own estimate of the cost of meeting the 
backlogs—normalization in a services delivery sense—is $4 billion over 5 years.25 This is conservative, 
and does not take into account the extremely worrying evidence that much of the expenditure to date 
is focused on intervention administration rather than delivery of additional or new services to Aboriginal 
people such as bricks and mortar housing or schools. I also note that this morning’s election spendometer 
in The Australian (7 November 2007) exceeded $53 billion, mainly in the form of tax cuts to those relatively 
well off.
Second, the intervention is unworkable because it is unplanned (as distinct from untimetabled) in 
terms of the Commonwealth’s capacity to deliver—bearing in mind that the Commonwealth has been 
delivering programs to remote NT for decades—and in terms of assessing and differentiating the needs 
of the 73 prescribed communities. It is also unworkable because it will be dependent on local on-the-
ground personnel and expertise and organisations to implement, yet these are the very organisations that 
have been financially neglected, demeaned as failures and that are now being alienated, dismantled and 
depoliticised.
The Commonwealth is starting to realise both these problems as it is forced beyond simplistic mantras and 
passionate rhetoric and crunches up against hard reality. We are already seeing early evidence of attempts 
to walk away from responsibility for implementing the intervention. 
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In August, the Prime Minister criticised the Martin Government and Minister Brough continues to do 
so. At the same time the Commonwealth has provided substantial new resources ($600 million) to the 
NT Government and is delegating delivery responsibility—including to new areas like outstations that 
historically have been a Commonwealth responsibility.26 The Territory will now look to cascade program 
delivery down to local, community-based organisations. The problem is that without CDEP organisations 
it seems unlikely there will be community capacity to deliver. 
Despite the existence of a bilateral agreement between the Commonwealth and the NT signed in 2005, the 
two levels of government seem to be working against each other; for instance with different approaches 
to implementing the Little Children are Sacred report. Indigenous people are the inevitable victims of such 
inter-governmental bickering and program delivery buck passing.
Also, on theoretical and comparative historical, national and international grounds the overall approach 
seems a recipe for disaster. It is neo-paternalist, imposed without consultation, top-down, racist, non-
discretionary, disempowering and nowhere implemented in its totality. While some Indigenous people 
want to cherry pick sensible aspects of the intervention, such as access to adequate housing, schooling and 
police, the totality of the package is probably far worse than its individual parts.
If I can stand here before you and make such dire predictions, doesn’t the Australian Government also 
realize this? If it does, why did it embark on this policy adventure? I reiterate that:
• The intervention was implemented for political reasons, seizing a political opportunity. Part of 
the reason I can say this with confidence is that the 2007–08 election year Budget, announced 
just a month or so before the ‘national emergency’, failed to address seriously Indigenous 
backlogs—it was a budget of disappointment.27
• The Commonwealth had reached a policy tipping point built of frustration with the NT 
Government, mainly about land rights reform, and exercised its ability to intervene because of 
the ‘territory powers’ available under the Constitution.
• The Howard Government also saw an opportunity to appease influential conservative interests 
with some old scores to settle. The ideological authority came from a deep-seated belief in the 
market and its ability to deliver to Indigenous Australians, even in situations where the market 
is largely absent.
• The moral authority or moral cover came from the emotive issue of child abuse and supporting 
Indigenous voices—including Noel Pearson, Warren Mundine and Sue Gordon—mainly from 
outside the NT, people who political scientist Paul t’Hart has termed ‘moral entrepreneurs’.28 
It was only in September 2007 when an Memorandum Of Understanding was signed with 
Galarrwuy Yunupingu for land reform in NE Arnhem Land that approval for the intervention 
was won from an influential NT Indigenous leader.29
• The political authority was derived from a Senate majority and from ALP bipartisanship 
or acquiescence. This can be explained in part by what Paul t’Hart has described as ‘crisis 
exploitation’ that suspends ‘politics as usual’ for the duration of an emergency.30
The government’s rhetoric is powerful: those who oppose intervention measures are naysayers—at best 
they have nothing better to offer and at worst are aiders and abettors of child abuse. Yet despite the 
extremist framing of the debate and associated attempts to discredit any contestation of the intervention’s 
approach and measures, there have been criticisms and dissident voices from the outset. 
What do affected communities themselves think about the intervention? I asked the five communities 
reported above to highlight the three best and three worst aspects of the intervention, and elicited the 
responses recorded at Table 4. It is interesting that some saw positives in the intervention, but overall, 
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the negatives outweigh the positives, bearing in mind that in some communities many of the measures 
have not yet been implemented. One sentiment that has come across very strongly in my discussions with 
communities is that a big negative is ‘humbugging’: not from kin as Major General Dave Chalmers suggests, 
but from the intervention task force, volunteers and bureaucrats.31 As one collaborator commented, ‘it is 
snowing white’, an interesting metaphor for the Top End.
I too have been challenged to outline if I have found any positives in the intervention, and at the risk of 
being accused of ‘me-too-ism’, I do see some big picture positives that can be compared to community 
perspectives: 
• There is an unprecedented national focus on Indigenous affairs, unfortunately mainly in the NT 
and mainly negative.
• There is a growing funding realism about the extent of the historic backlogs and what it will 
cost the nation to meet them.
• There is an emerging repoliticisation of the Indigenous sector after the turmoil that followed 
the abolition of ATSIC.
Table 4. Indigenous responses to the Northern Territory Intervention,  
October 2006.
Best things Worst things
Opportunity for change Loss of control
New dialogues within and between 
communities/unification of Aboriginal people Pressure to be like whites
Some proper jobs
External micro management/government 
thinking they know what is best for us
No recalcitrants or work avoiders Confusion
All employees work for community Avoiding local leaders and elders
Kava ban (in a community without a kava 
licencing scheme in place)
Waste of productive time/additional meetings/
’snowing white’/time invested in fighting the 
intervention
Government neglect revealed
Racist measures/overriding Racial 
Discrimination Act
Strengthened connection to country Bipartisan political support (Commonwealth)
Increased school attendance Disregard of Indigenous perspectives
Increased Aboriginal political awareness
Disempowerment and renewed distrust/
powerlessness
Negative stereotyping/damaging the image and 
reputation of Aboriginal people/use of anecdote 
rather than objective data
Disruption to CDEP/loss of pride in CDEP 
ventures
Sewing seeds of conflict between Aboriginal 
people
Undermining land rights and permit system
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• There is a slowly growing awareness of Indigenous diversity, both in terms of livelihoods and 
cultures, but also in terms of perspectives about approaches to development. Arguably, while 
one set of mainstreaming views have been privileged to date, alternative, challenging views 
are increasingly being heard, especially from the Combined Aboriginal Organisations of the 
Northern Territory. It remains to be seen whether, as a nation, we will learn to problematise 
naive universalism because one size will not fit all, especially in remote Indigenous Australia.
• There is evidence of emerging alliances between social justice legal practitioners and Aboriginal 
land owners and organisations, evident in the High Court case challenging the constitutional 
validity of key aspects of the intervention.32 The legal system might provide one means to 
‘reclaim politics from leaders, who are poorly advised and carry personal ideological agendas’ 
(to paraphrase Walter & Strangio, 2007).
ARE NEo-PATERNAlISm AND INDIGENouS DEVEloPmENT 
ComPATIBlE?
Let me turn now to answer the question posed by my title, are neo-paternalism and Indigenous development 
compatible? This question may appear oxymoronic, but clearly for some ‘neoliberalisation’ may result from 
what Rebecca Stringer has recently termed ‘a nightmare of the neocolonial kind’.33 One has to remain open 
to the possibility that mainstreaming might be the preference for some, or many.
For sustainable Indigenous development, in all its diversity, to occur, I have consistently tried to highlight 
the following five requirements for progress. They are not based on rocket science or some extremist 
ideology, but on basic notions of bottom-up participatory development: 
1. At the broadest level, it is imperative to recognise Indigenous diversity and difference, preferably 
as a positive that benefits the Australian nation, rather than as something just to be tolerated. 
The current neoliberal hegemony that privileges both individualism and mainstream Australian 
social norms needs to be challenged.
2. There is a need for partnerships with communities and the establishment of appropriate elected 
or nominated channels to formally hear Indigenous aspirations. Not just Mal Brough’s all-too-
often cited ‘private dissenting voice lost at the back of the crowd, except to the minister’s 
perceptive ear’;34 or just those—like Noel Pearson or Warren Mundine or the NIC or now 
Galarrwuy Yunupingu—who advocate for policy change that echoes the Howard Government’s 
ideology and approach.
3 There is a need for realistic local and regional investments to catch up and close the gaps. It 
must enable local opportunity and take advantage of the richness of the environmentally-intact 
and biodiversity-rich land holdings owned by many living in remote situations. This enablement 
will require abandoning periodic loose and degrading talk about closing down unviable black 
communities, an argument using a culturally-constructed and selectively-applied notion of 
‘viability’ while privileging some non-viable sections of the broader community.35
4 There is a need to build local intercultural organisations and institutions and capabilities, 
investing in making imperfect organisations better rather than perfect, but ensuring ‘good 
enough governance’ for local control. The appointment of government business managers and 
the closing down of CDEP organisations is very counter to this approach.
5 There is a need to plan at the local and regional levels for sustainable outcomes at realistic 
levels that are clear about livelihood possibilities; to undertake some rigorous needs-based 
analysis; and put some negotiated evaluation frameworks in place.
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To CoNCluDE
I want to return to the theme of this conference: ‘Forty Years On: Political transformation and sustainability 
since the Referendum and into the future’. I note that a paternalistic state project of assimilation has been 
tried before, some 40 years ago, and it failed. Now it is being tried again under a different paradigm 
of neoliberalism and it will fail again. There are already early signs during the ‘stabilisation’ phase that 
existing development gains are being jeopardized by the machinery of intervention. Some talk of ‘policy 
failure’ or ‘failed states’ in remote Indigenous Australia; I just ask what have we learnt as a nation in the 
last forty years that makes us so blind as to revisit past failure? The ‘national emergency’ will peter out, if 
it has not already, but there are inherent dangers for Aboriginal people and the nation if it fails. We risk a 
loss of national goodwill, a waste of hundreds of millions of dollars, and the dismantling of some robust 
and important development institutions built up over the past 40 years.
Ultimately, as a nation, we face deeply-rooted, difficult, and arguably intractable Indigenous development 
problems, in the NT and beyond. A few days of political opportunism following a decade of policy-making 
laziness will not magically solve these problems. In 2007 we saw political bipartisanship in embracing 
the ‘national emergency’: I suspect that in 2008 we will see renewed bipartisanship in abandoning this 
expensive and misguided policy adventure. Perhaps in 2008 we might finally see the collaborations and the 
creative hard thinking and the financial commitments that will all be needed to address the most difficult 
issue that we face as a nation; that of Indigenous disadvantage. I sincerely hope that the 2007 fiasco has 
not jeopardized our chances.
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